Sociology and Ideology. ( Ninth M.N. Srinivas Memorial Lecture) (NIAS Lecture No.L2-2008) by Beteille, Andre
André Béteille





NINTH MN SRINIVAS MEMORIAL LECTURE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES
Bangalore
























NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES 
Indian Institute of Science Campus, Bangalore 560012 

1 
would like to use this occasion to discuss the 
relationship between sociology and ideology.  My 
view of the subject, which has been much influenced by the 
work of M N Srinivas, is that it is desirable to keep the two 
apart, although it has proved difficult, particularly in India, 
to insulate the practice of sociology from the demands of 
ideology.  In what follows I will have something to say both 
about the justification for keeping the two apart and the 
difficulty of doing so in a clear and consistent way.   
Those who wish to keep the two apart are obliged to 
explain, no matter how briefly, what they mean by 
sociology and by ideology.  This is not an easy thing to do.  
Sociologists are by no means in complete agreement about 
the nature and scope of their discipline as an intellectual 
pursuit; and, moreover, their conception of the aims and 
objectives of sociology as a discipline may not correspond 
very well with their practices as sociologists.  The concept 
of ideology has, if anything, an even wider range of 
connotations, and those who use it generally avoid giving it 
a clear or definite meaning. 
Sociology, as I understand it, is an empirical and 
comparative discipline devoted to the systematic study of 
society through the application of a distinctive body of 
concepts and methods, and here I would like to treat 
sociology as being inclusive of social anthropology.  What I 
would like to stress at the outset is that sociology is an 
empirical rather than a normative discipline, although, as I 
will point out later, the relationship between value 
judgements and judgements of reality is a difficult subject 
on which there are considerable differences of opinion.  The 
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primary aim of an ideology is not to understand or interpret 
society, but to change it by acting politically on it.  
Sociology as an intellectual discipline does not have any 
definite or specific political agenda, but an ideology that did 
not have one would hardly deserve that name.   
An ideology is normative, and not merely descriptive or 
analytical in its orientation.  It is based on a particular 
vision of society, its past and its future, and it seeks to 
articulate that vision through a set of arguments about what 
is desirable and what needs to be done to bring it into effect.  
An ideology cannot be understood only in terms of its 
argument or its vision, however appealing or persuasive 
these might be.  Ideologies seek to connect the universe of 
values with the realm of power, and make demands on the 
intellectual that are different from those made by science 
and scholarship (Béteille 1980).     
The commitment of an intellectual to an ideology may take 
a weak or a strong form.  In the case of most persons it takes 
a weak rather than a strong form, although there are 
intellectuals who have a natural inclination for expressing 
even a diffuse commitment strongly and forcefully, if not 
always cogently.  Those who maintain or express strong 
commitment to an ideology tend to be drawn towards 
partisanship in the cause of a particular political platform or 
a particular political movement.  Many believe, and I share 
that belief, that scholarship and partisanship make uneasy 




t is not my argument that commitment to a 
particular ideology or even a particular political 
cause is in itself a bad thing.  There are some who believe 
that ideological commitment in the cause of, say, 
nationalism or the class struggle, or feminism, provides an 
additional impetus to science and scholarship.  I have 
known many natural scientists – physicists, geneticists, and 
others – who have maintained a lifelong commitment to one 
or another ideology or political cause while producing work 
of high quality as scientists.  But the case is somewhat 
different with those whose scholarly work is in the human 
sciences.  Ideological commitment does not impinge in the 
same way or to the same extent on the two types of 
intellectual activity.  
The distinction between value judgements and judgements 
of reality presents itself very differently in physics and in 
sociology.  In physics we do not ask what values objects in 
motion or at rest assign to their own actions.  In sociology 
we can hardly avoid asking what values a person assigns to 
his own conduct and to the conduct of others in a given 
social situation.  Where it comes to the study of 
fundamental particles or the genetic code, it does not matter 
very much whether the scientist is a radical or a 
conservative, a pacifist or a militarist.  No special care is 
required to insulate the course of his research from his 
political commitments.  It is a somewhat different matter 
when a Marxist studies disputes in an industrial plant, or a 
feminist studies conflict within the family      
We must take note of the ways in which sociology is like 
any other science and the ways in which it differs from the 
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natural sciences.  It is like any other science because it aims 
to arrive at a systematic body of knowledge whose validity 
can be tested by standardized procedures.  It has its own 
concepts and methods, and its own body of data.  A large 
part of sociological enquiry and analysis consists of the 
accumulation of new data to examine, criticise and 
reformulate existing knowledge about society and its 
structures and processes.  It cannot be equated with 
common sense which is limited, narrow and often resistant 
to unfamiliar facts and conclusions (Béteille 2002: 13-27).    
Sociology is different from the natural sciences because it 
deals with facts of a different order.  These facts are not 
easily amenable to the kinds of tests to which the natural 
scientist is able to submit the facts with which he deals.  
Moreover, the concepts used in sociological enquiry and 
analysis are fluid and ambiguous.  It has proved very 
difficult to eliminate preconceptions from the study of 
society and to replace them with concepts on whose 
meanings there is general agreement.  This is partly because 
such concepts as family, class and community carry 
strongly evaluative connotations for those who use them.   
A book by a well-known German scholar on the origin and 
development of sociology is entitled Between Science and 
Literature (Lepenies 1988).  It captures nicely the conflicting 
aims and tendencies through which the systematic study of 
society emerged in France, England and Germany.  The 
sensibility of the writer played an important part in this 
development.  But this sensibility was regulated and 
channelled by the disciplined and methodical study of an 
increasing body of facts.  We must never forget the part 
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played by the controlled accumulation of facts in reaching a 
broader and deeper understanding of social life.  Sociology 
would not be what it is without the development of new 
methods and techniques for the collection and scrutiny of 
facts.  To be sure, the facts with which the sociologist has to 
deal have their own distinctive features, but he cannot take 
with those facts the kind of liberty that is allowed to the 
story teller. 
Fidelity to facts imposes on the sociologist restraints of a 
kind by which neither the author of fiction nor the 
proponent of ideologies is generally bound.  The ideologist 
is concerned less with society as it is than with society as it 
ought to be.  His orientation, as I have said, is normative 
rather than empirical, and where different ideologies 
coexist in the same society, disagreements among their 
proponents cannot be easily settled by an appeal to facts, 
for the same facts acquire different colours when they pass 
through the prisms of divergent ideologies.    
The conflicting aims and tendencies which shaped the 
development of sociology left their mark on the thought 
and work of M N Srinivas.  On the one hand, he was a 
strong advocate of the ‘field view’ which placed the 
sociologist under obligation to observe and record life as it 
was actually lived, without embellishment.  In what he 
wrote on village, caste and family, he was untiring in his 
effort to penetrate the myths that had grown around these 
institutions in order to reveal their actual structure and 
operation.  He shared the scepticism of the scientist about 
all forms of received wisdom, and was acutely aware that 
the received wisdom about society, and that too one’s own 
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society, was much more difficult to dislodge than the 
received wisdom about nature. 
While Srinivas was greatly attracted by the detached and 
dispassionate study of reality, he also realized that that kind 
of study could not be pursued beyond certain limits.  He 
often spoke about the need for empathy in fieldwork, and 
the value of participation and not just observation for the 
collection of data.  But while he recognized all of this, he 
also maintained that a line had to be drawn between 
sociological enquiry and social advocacy.  For all his 
scepticism about the possibility for any individual 
sociologist to achieve complete detachment in his work, he 
was on the side of detachment as against advocacy. 
¶ ¶ 
he observation and description of facts does not 
complete the work of the sociologist.  Another 
important part of it is to connect together the facts that he 
and other sociologists have collected.  For this to be done 
effectively, the facts have to be collected according to 
certain accepted procedures, and the concepts used in 
describing and analysing them must have some general 
acceptance.  All sociologists operate, explicitly or implicitly, 
with the notion of society as some kind of a system.  But 
there is disagreement about the nature of that system, and, 
hence, about the approach best suited to its study.   
The disagreement is clearly in evidence in the work of 




Brown and E E Evans-Pritchard.  Although Srinivas’s early 
training as a sociologist had been under G S Ghurye, his 
stay at Oxford between 1945 and 1952 had a great influence 
of his work (Béteille 2003).  There he started his work under 
Radcliffe-Brown and completed it under Evans-Pritchard.  
Although he remained loyal to Radcliffe-Brown, I believe 
that in the end he found the work of Evans-Pritchard more 
congenial.   
Radcliffe-Brown believed that a social system was a kind of 
natural system and that it was possible to create a natural 
science of society.  That is the case he had made in his 
famous seminar at Chicago of which the text was published 
posthumously (Radcliffe-Brown 1957).  The same argument 
was made by him in the essays brought together by Srinivas 
and also published posthumously (Radcliffe-Brown 1962).  
If you regard the study of society as a natural science, you 
will find it difficult to accommodate any kind of ideology in 
its approach and method.  While Srinivas never really 
warmed to the idea of a natural science of society, he was at 
one with Radcliffe-Brown in regarding ideology as an 
unwanted intrusion into the study of society.   
Evans-Pritchard, who was Srinivas’s other teacher at 
Oxford, gradually distanced himself from the view that 
social systems could be studied as natural systems or that 
there could be a natural science of society.  His view of the 
subject was expressed in his Marrett lecture at Oxford at 
which Srinivas was present.  In that lecture Evans-Pritchard 
(1962: 26) argued that social anthropology ‘studies societies 
as moral systems and not as natural systems, that it is 
interested in design rather than in process, and that it 
SOCIOLOGY AND IDEOLOGY 
8 
therefore seeks patterns and not scientific laws, and 
interprets rather than explains’.  Needless to say there are 
echoes here of Max Weber’s conception of sociology as a 
science of the interpretation of meaningful action 
(Sinnverstehendesoziologie). 
The rejection of the view that sociology is a natural science 
does not mean that social facts cannot be studied 
systematically or that agreed procedures cannot be devised 
for their systematic study.  Evans-Pritchard would maintain 
that ideology is an impediment to the study of society 
whether one views it as a natural system or a moral system.  
The student of society seeks to interpret the meanings that 
others give to their actions and not advocate his own values 
for adoption by them.  Only, insulation from ideology poses 
additional challenges for those who regard societies as 
moral rather than natural systems.  
Srinivas’s two teachers at Oxford, Radcliffe-Brown and 
Evans-Pritchard, both used the concept of social structure in 
their analyses, although each formulated it in his own way.  
Srinivas used it extensively in his study of village, caste and 
kinship.  He felt that most prevalent accounts of these 
institutions lacked a proper framework for the presentation 
and analysis of facts.  As a result, facts of different kinds 
were jumbled together, and value judgements and 




et me now return to the point that sociology is an 
empirical and not a normative science.  As an 
empirical science, it is concerned with the observation, 
description, analysis, interpretation and explanation of 
facts.  It deals with a specific body of facts which we 
characterise as social facts.  They are social by virtue of 
being general and collective.  Explanations of social facts by 
an appeal to universal principles of individual psychology 
run into serious difficulties sooner or later.  But the 
distinction between psychology and sociology, or 
individual representations and collective representations, is 
a complex and difficult topic into which I do not wish to 
enter here.  
Speculation about the nature and forms of social life is as 
old as society itself.  India has a rich and ancient civilization 
in whose intellectual tradition speculation and introspection 
occupied a central place. When we look back on India’s 
intellectual achievements in ancient and medieval times, we 
are struck as much by its strength as by its one-sidedness.  
This is manifested in the continuous emphasis on formal 
intellectual disciplines and a corresponding neglect of 
empirical knowledge.  There are great, not to say 
spectacular achievements in mathematics, grammar, logic 
and metaphysics, but hardly any contribution to or even 
interest in such subjects as history and geography, if we 
leave aside what came with the Arabs. 
This peculiar emphasis on formal as against empirical 
knowledge might have something to do with the social 
framework of the cultivation and transmission of 
knowledge in past times.  The Hindu intellectual tradition 
L 
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was exclusive in more than one sense and to an unusual 
degree.  Its bearers belonged to a particular caste, the 
Brahmins, and other members had a small part to play in 
the cultivation and transmission of systematic knowledge.  
Obviously, others also pursued knowledge and contributed 
to its growth in one way or another.  But the traditional 
Hindu literati, who were the repositories of systematic 
theoretical knowledge, were by all accounts socially far 
more exclusive than their European or Chinese or even 
Islamic counterparts.   
A tightly-closed intellectual stratum, acutely conscious of 
the continuity of its own tradition, develops its own 
intellectual style.  What is described as scholasticism had a 
luxuriant growth in India.  Observers through the ages 
commented on the inward-looking character of the bearers 
of the Indian intellectual tradition and on their overweening 
conceit.  The Arab scholar, al-Biruni who was in India in the 
early part of the eleventh century, was baffled by his 
encounter with the local pundits.  They were supremely 
self-confident and treated him with great condescension.  
When he tried to bring some of his own knowledge to their 
attention, they refused to believe that he could have 
acquired that knowledge on his own or from anyone but a 
Brahmin pundit.  
The overvaluation of theoretical knowledge or knowledge 
acquired through ratiocination, above empirical knowledge, 
or knowledge acquired through observation remains a 
feature of brahminical culture to this day.  This may be 
illustrated with an example from my own fieldwork in a 
village in Thanjavur district with a community of Brahmins.  
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After spending some months recording observations on the 
domestic rituals of the Brahmins, I decided to shift my 
attention to the non-Brahmins in the village.  I mentioned 
the matter to an influential Brahmin resident who had been 
of much help to me and whose counsel I valued.  He told 
me calmly that I need not seek out any non-Brahmin 
informants for he would himself tell me whatever I wanted 
to know about their religious observances; and if that did 
not satisfy me, he would ask the most knowledgeable 
Brahmin in the village to answer whatever questions 
remained.  I explained to him that what I wanted was to 
make my observations and secure my information at first 
hand.  He said that he knew all that very well, but the non-
Brahmins, being peasants, not only did not understand their 
own rituals but would lack the capacity to describe them to 
me in a coherent way.  Not only that, he took the same view 
of the facts relating to agriculture.  The non-Brahmins might 
practise agriculture, but the Brahmins alone knew the 
theory of it, and it was the theory that counted rather than 
the practice.             
It is in this context that we have to understand Srinivas’s 
tireless advocacy of the ‘field view’ as against the ‘book 
view’ of Indian society.  For him, the field view of society 
represented the reality on the ground and constituted the 
core of the sociological approach.  The book view, on the 
other hand was based on readings of the classical and 
medieval texts which provided representations of social 
institutions from which the reality on the ground often 
diverged considerably.  Srinivas was acutely conscious of 
the fact that the adoption of the field view in place of the 
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book view meant a departure from the intellectual tradition 
he had inherited from the past.  
Appreciation of the importance of facts for the systematic 
and comparative study of societies has led to the 
development and expansion of exact and reliable methods 
of data collection.  The sociologist or social anthropologist 
who sets out to study any aspect of Indian society now has 
at his disposal a much larger body of facts than was 
available to earlier generations of scholars.  Arguments 
about the nature and operation of social institutions no 
longer have to rest on introspection and speculation alone; 
they can be tested either by an appeal to the available facts 
or by the collection of new facts.  The movement away from 
introspection and speculation towards observation, 
description and analysis has been a movement from 
sociology as an amateur pursuit to sociology as a 
profession.  
Attitudes towards the reliability and accuracy of data began 
to change as sociology began to grow as a profession.  The 
change was more dramatic in social anthropology or the 
study of simple societies than in sociology or the study of 
complex societies.  But sociologists and social 
anthropologists alike became more demanding about the 
quality and quantity of the data on which the analysis of 
social life was based. By the end of World War II, training in 
the collection of data became a requirement for entry into 
the profession.  It is not that sociologists ceased to use 
official statistics or historical records; but they began to rely 
more and more on data collected by procedures they 
themselves devised and refined.   
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To the extent that sociology is both a discipline and a 
profession, the data collected by individual sociologists 
become a collective resource.  The sociologist does not 
collect data only for his own use, but also for use by others.  
For this to be possible and effective, a certain amount of 
standardization of methods and procedures is required.  
Standardization is easier to achieve in survey research than 
in participant-observation, but this does not mean that 
those who collect data through intensive fieldwork or 
through case studies are free to do as they please 
(Srivastava 2004). 
Whether they study their own society or some other society, 
sociologists, like human beings in general, have their own 
preconceptions, not to say biases and prejudices.  It is 
difficult not to have any preconceptions on such matters as 
family, religion and class.  Ideological biases tend to creep 
in when one is not sufficiently alert to the demands of 
empirical enquiry.  The shift from introspection and 
speculation to observation and description has been a 
significant step forward in creating awareness among 
students of society of the difference between value 
judgements and judgements of reality.  
While it is desirable to exclude preconceptions from the 
systematic study of society, it is doubtful that they can be 
eliminated altogether.  Observation and description are no 
doubt important in the study of society as it actually exists.  
But no systematic study of facts on the ground can get very 
far without the use of concepts.  The question that arises 
then is about the extent to which we can formulate clear 
and rigorous concepts of, let us say, family, class and 
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community without allowing our preconceptions to enter 
into the very definitions we use of these phenomena.  Here I 
would only say that as an intellectual discipline sociology 
requires a certain disposition of the mind among its 
practitioners.  The sociologist has to keep an open mind 
about his concepts and be prepared to revise and 
reformulate them in the light of new data and of alternative 
formulations of the same concept by others engaged in the 
study of the same subject, irrespective of ideological 
predilections.   
¶ ¶ 
do not wish to give the impression that 
sociologists themselves are in complete agreement 
on the relationship between value judgements and 
judgements of reality.  There are disagreements both about 
accepting the distinction in principle and making it 
operational in practice.  These questions have agitated the 
best minds among students of society for a hundred years, 
and nobody really expects to find clear answers to them 
that will be to the satisfaction of all.  What I would like to 
do here is to indicate some of the basic issues by taking as 
my example the sociological study of religion.  That would 
be an appropriate example here because the first major 
work by Srinivas (1952), Religion and Society among the 
Coorgs, has a direct bearing on these questions.  
Is there a distinctive sociological approach to the study of 
religion?  Religion itself has been a subject of study and 




by contrast a relatively young subject.  The oldest branch of 
study devoted to religion, and, at least in the western 
tradition, by far the most important one for centuries is 
theology.  Then there is the philosophy of religion which 
now occupies some of the ground held by theology in the 
past.  The philosophy of religion looks to theology on one 
side and the psychology of religion on the other.  We have 
also the very broad and assorted body of work that goes by 
the name of the history of religions.  We finally come to 
sociology and social anthropology which have also made 
religion a subject of their study.   
The different approaches to the study of religion combine 
empirical and normative components in very different 
ways.  The distinction between the normative and the 
empirical approaches is seen most clearly in the contrast 
between the theological and the sociological approaches to 
the study of religion.  The theologian is concerned primarily 
with questions of the truth and efficacy of religious beliefs 
and practices.  Such questions do not concern the sociologist 
in the same way.  His primary aim is to observe, describe, 
interpret and explain the ways in which religious beliefs 
and practices actually operate.  He does not seek to 
determine whether the beliefs he studies are true or false, or 
whether the practices he observes do or do not have the 
effects the believer desires or expects them to have.   
Religion and Society among the Coorgs is the first significant 
sociological study of Hinduism made by an Indian; 
unfortunately, few such studies have been made since then.  
It derives its sociological significance from the fact that the 
description and analysis are presented from the standpoint 
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of the religious sceptic rather than the religious believer.  It 
is empirical rather than normative in its orientation.   
Srinivas’s approach to religion was very different from that 
of the philosopher, Dr S Radhakrishnan with whose work 
he was familiar.  He did not seek to expound the essence of 
Hinduism.   As a sociologist, he did not treat religion as 
either completely autonomous, or as being eternal, 
invariant and unchanging.  Religious beliefs and practices 
vary and change, and this has to be viewed in the light of 
variation and change in the structure of society.  No religion 
operates independently of specific social arrangements, and 
Srinivas set out to examine the two-way relationship 
between religion and social structure.  He spoke of local 
Hinduism, regional Hinduism, peninsular Hinduism and 
all-India Hinduism.  He also showed how religious beliefs 
and practices were refracted by the structures of joint 
family, caste and village.  This kind of approach does not 
always find favour with the religious believer who is 
inclined to regard religion as pure, and society as corrupt.  
The study of Coorg religion is sociological to the extent that 
it steers clear of any attempt to either extol or condemn 
Hinduism or any of its beliefs and practices.  In my 
recollection of Srinivas in my early years with him in Delhi, 
he was inclined to poke fun at those who glorified 
Hinduism on the basis of some idealized conception of it, 
saying that they did not know what Hinduism really was.  
But then, he would not put up with any wholesale 
condemnation of Hinduism either.  He once returned from 
a seminar, infuriated by a participant who had described 
Hindu beliefs and practices as ‘mumbo-jumbo’.  It is no 
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easy matter to remain detached, objective and value-neutral 
in the study of religion, and particularly of one’s own 
religion.  
There are two aspects of the sociological approach to which 
I would like to briefly draw attention.  The sociologist does 
not study religion as a thing in itself but in relation to 
society and its other institutions.  He acknowledges the 
great importance of religion but does not assign pre-
eminence to it over all other aspects of society.  He does not 
dismiss religion as ‘false consciousness’, but at the same 
time does not subscribe to the religious interpretation of the 
world as a whole. 
The second aspect of the sociological approach is that it is 
comparative in its aims.  This means that it addresses all 
religions and not just one’s own religion, and tries to treat 
all of them even-handedly.  This is difficult, if not 
impossible, if the sociologist is committed to the values of a 
single religion and seeks to carry those values into the study 
of all religions.  He is likely to do this unconsciously in any 
case, but must try consciously and methodically to restrain 
his natural inclination arising from his socialization within 
a particular tradition when he undertakes a sociological 
study of religion or, for that matter, any sociological study.  
The sociologist’s obligation to be even-handed and value 
neutral in the study of religion is particularly important in a 
country like India where different religions with different 
world views and ideologies co-exist and are allowed and 
encouraged to grow and flourish.  The comparative study 
of religion becomes difficult where studies of religious 
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beliefs and practices become divided among sociologists 
according to their religious identities so that Hinduism is 
studied only by Hindus, Islam only by Muslims and 
Christianity only by Christians. 
¶ ¶ 
would now like to examine very briefly whether 
the argument that I have made in favour of 
detachment, objectivity and value-neutrality can be 
extended from the field of religion to other fields of 
sociological enquiry and analysis.  In my experience, many 
of those who are prepared to go along with the insulation of 
the study of religion from value judgements are not 
prepared to do so in the case of politics.  These are mainly 
secular intellectuals who believe in the primacy of politics 
over religion, a belief to which, as a sociologist, I find it 
difficult to subscribe. 
The most sustained and penetrating opposition to the 
separation of facts and values may be found in the Marxist 
tradition of social enquiry and analysis.  Although that 
tradition has lost many of its adherents in the west, partly 
as a result of the failure of the Soviet experiment, it 
continues to have an appeal in India and other countries in 
Asia, Africa and Latin America.  In countries marked by 
acute economic and social problems, many continue to find 
inspiration in the ringing words of the Theses on Feuerbach: 
‘The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in 
various ways; the point is to change it’.  Those who have a 




towards the use of political power for bringing it about.  
This is known in philosophical parlance as the dialectical 
unit of theory and practice. 
The work of Marx provided a great inspiration for the 
sociological study of economic life.  Marx sought to develop 
a distinctive approach in which social structure, social 
conflict and social change were interlinked in such a way 
that they could be understood only in terms of their mutual 
relations.  A central place is occupied in it by social class; 
hence it is often described as the ‘class approach’.  The 
Marxian approach, as developed by Lenin and others 
among his followers, adopts a distinct conception of class 
which in its turn cannot be understood except in terms of a 
distinctive social theory and a distinctive political practice.  
The approach indicated above has been described as a 
dialectical approach, by which is meant an approach based 
on the movement towards unity of subject and object.  The 
working class begins as the object of history, but in course 
of time becomes its subject or principal agent.  This is the 
process whereby the proletariat, from being a class in itself, 
becomes a class for itself.  The study of class is also a study 
of class consciousness, and class and class consciousness 
can be understood best by those who participate in their 
formation.  The political practice through which this has to 
take place is not a distraction from the understanding of 
class but an essential part of it.  In the view of Marx and his 
followers, only those who engage consciously and actively 
in the process of class formation can understand the real 
nature and significance of class. 
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The ‘class approach’ is not the only approach that follows 
the path of commitment and engagement for the 
understanding and analysis of social and political reality.  
The nationalist approach, which puts nation above class, 
has a family resemblance with Marxism in the demands it 
makes from students of society and history.  The nationalist 
too seeks to understand the nation and its identity and 
unity, but the understanding he seeks is not that of the 
detached or disinterested bystander.  Nation building is a 
continuous process that is never completed, and the 
nationalist intellectual believes that only he who contributes 
to the process from the inside can expect to understand its 
true nature and significance.  In a country such as India, 
there are many forms of sub-nationalism that make similar 
demands on their protagonist; needless to say such 
demands sometimes act against each other and against 
those of nationalism itself.    
Several new branches of social enquiry and analysis have 
emerged that also question the justification for separating 
value judgements from judgements of reality.  They include 
gender studies, Dalit studies and minority studies.  These 
studies have sought to introduce new forms of discourse 
that are different in many ways from the discourse of 
academic social science.  They impinge on one or more of 
the established academic disciplines, but also cut across 
them.  Although they have emerged relatively recently, 
they have found accommodation in the universities and 
have begun to influence teaching and research in such 
subjects as sociology and social anthropology.  
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Among the fields that I have just mentioned, gender studies 
is perhaps the oldest and the most widely recognized.  It 
has grown in response to women’s movements in the 
different parts of the world.  It is not that the position of 
women did not receive any attention in the past.  Evans-
Pritchard (1965) published a collection of essays with the 
title The Position of Women in Primitive Societies and Other 
Essays more than 40 years ago, and Srinivas (2002: 279-300) 
himself chose the subject of ‘The Changing Position of 
Indian Women’ for his Huxley Memorial Lecture in the 
mid-seventies.  But the emergence of women’s movements 
has given the subject a new intellectual focus and new 
political energy.  
The conditions of their origin and growth have been such 
that gender studies are largely in the care of women, Dalit 
studies in the care of Dalits and minority studies in the care 
of minorities.  In this respect the class approach is different.  
Although the proletariat is at the centre of its attention, it 
has been created and developed, from Marx’s time down to 
our own by members of the middle class and not the 
working class.  However, that approach has provided 
political as well as intellectual inspiration to all 
emancipationist movements, whether of women or of Dalits 
or of the minorities.  In that sense, the work of Marx has 
been ‘equivocal and inexhaustible’ (Aron 1970: 355-77). 
¶ ¶ 
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have tried to explain the nature of sociology as an 
empirical discipline which aims at the systematic 
and comparative study of societies, and to distinguish 
sociology defined in that way from ideologies that are 
systems of idea driven by more or less definite political 
objectives.  I have also indicated how the practice of 
sociology is influenced by ideologies whose aims are 
different from those of the former.  Those whose objective is 
to develop sociology as an intellectual discipline in India 
today cannot wish out of existence the strong ideological 
currents to which many students of the subject are drawn.   
I would like to return in the end to the question of the 
relationship between value judgements and judgements of 
reality.  As I have emphasized, this is a difficult question on 
which serious, and perhaps irremovable, disagreements 
continue to exist among students of society.   
Positivists, who view the systematic study of society in the 
image of the natural sciences, believe that the separation of 
facts and values is not only essential but can be successfully 
accomplished through the formulation of standardized 
methods and procedures.  I believe that such standardized 
methods and procedures are very useful, but that they have 
their limitations and can carry us forward for some distance 
in the human sciences, but not nearly the same distance as 
in the natural sciences.  An obsession with ‘scientific 
method’ has sometimes had a stultifying effect on the 
understanding of society and its institutions. 
As against the positivists, there are those who advocate the 




the separation of facts and values is neither possible nor 
desirable, and that bringing the two together does not 
distort but enriches the understanding of society.  This 
course of action has many attractions, but I have found it 
prudent to maintain a distance from it because I believe that 
sooner or later it leads to the subordination of sociology in 
the service of ideology.   
It is the third view about the relationship between facts and 
values that I find the most attractive.  This view was 
elaborated in a series of writings by Max Weber about a 
hundred years ago.  It acknowledges both the necessity and 
the difficulty of consistently maintaining a separation 
between facts and values in the interpretation of human 
action.  As Weber put it, ‘When the normatively valid is the 
object of empirical investigation, its normative validity is 
disregarded.  Its “existence” and not its “validity” is what 
concerns the investigator’ (Weber 1949: 39).  But then he 
had also said: ‘Nor need I discuss further whether the 
distinction between empirical statements of fact and value-
judgements is “difficult” to make.  It is’ (Ibid.: 9). 
Because the study of society and its institutions requires 
close attention to the values of other persons of which one 
may approve or disapprove, implicitly if not explicitly, it is 
important to recognize that the standpoint from which a 
sociologist makes his study affects the course of that study.  
No single sociologist can study society from every possible 
standpoint.  Experience shows that two persons who 
examine the same social facts from two different 
standpoints tend to reach somewhat different conclusions.  
These different conclusions need not be contradictory; they 
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may be complementary.  It requires a special effort of will 
and of sympathy to reach a kind of reflective equilibrium 
between such conclusions when they are divergent.  To 
repeat what I have said in another context, ‘Where the same 
subject is being studied, and must be studied, by persons in 
different existential situations, very little progress can be 
made without candour about one’s own views and 
consideration for the views of others’ (Béteille 1987: 676).          
The problem of reconciling studies from different if not 
divergent standpoints comes up again and again in 
sociology.  I will end with one particular example because it 
is important in itself and because Srinivas gave much 
thought to it.  This is the problem of the insider versus the 
outsider in the study of society.  Srinivas acknowledged 
that the insider, or the person who studies his own society, 
enjoys certain advantages, but insisted that the outsider, or 
the person who studies a society other than his own, also 
has his share of advantages.  He said, ‘I must hasten to add 
that I am not only not against studies of a culture by 
outsiders but on the contrary I am positively for them … 
There cannot be a single correct or all-embracing view.  One 
view ought to be that of the insider and various views can 
be complementary even when – or specially when they 
differ from each other’ (Srinivas 2002: 560, italics in 
original).  
The practice of sociology and social anthropology in India 
has taught us that keeping an open mind is of the highest 
importance, and it is this that is threatened by a zealous 
commitment to an ideology.  It has taught us that there is 
no one unique or privileged standpoint in the study of 
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society and culture.  Even within the same society there 
generally is a plurality of standpoints, varying with 
religion, class, gender or moral and intellectual predilection, 
and, besides, different outsiders may view the same society 
from different standpoints.  Sociology and social 
anthropology cannot move forward unless the plurality of 
standpoints is accepted as a fundamental condition for the 
systematic and comparative study of society and culture.  
But it is one thing to acknowledge the value of, say, 
studying marriage from the standpoint of a woman, or 
discrimination from that of a Dalit, and quite another to 
have the standpoint itself defined by a particular political 
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